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Abstract  
Russian foreign policy demonstrates continuity and change. The Russian Federation has acted 
in several scenarios and, since 2000, with Vladimir Putin, its main objective has been to 
consolidate the status of the Russian Federation as a great power, in order to return to the 
glorious Soviet era. Maximising power and the pursuit of internal security are essential, 
because there is an international system in permanent anarchy. 
Putin’s third term was marked by the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of the Crimea, which 
contributed to a historical turning point in Russian foreign policy. Western sanctions due to 
the occupation of Crimea and military interference in eastern Ukraine have opened up a period 
of greater rivalry between Moscow and Washington, as well as the need for Russia to diversify 
its relations with emerging economies such as Iran and Turkey. This study finds out that 
Ankara and Tehran have a historical relationship with Moscow, despite some episodes and 
divergent positions that at certain moments have harmed relations. The issue of Syria, the 
fight against terrorism and violent extremism, agreements on oil and natural gas and relations 
with the Kurdish people are some of the key issues in the more or less friendly relations of 
the Kremlin with Ankara and Tehran. The state of Russian foreign policy and Russia’s relations 
with regional actors in the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Kurds) as well as 
the challenges Vladimir Putin’s Russia has to face in the region are addressed. 
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EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST1 
 
 
Henrique Alves Garcia 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The Russian Federation has acted in several scenarios and, since the political rise of 
Vladimir Putin, its main objective has been to consolidate the status of great power to 
return to the glorious Soviet era. The preference for a multipolar world order based on 
sovereignty and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs has been constantly 
present in official foreign policy documents and discourses. The independence recognition 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or the annexations of Crimea and Sevastopol’s naval base 
constitute a direct violation of those sovereign principles and territorial integrity. The 
Russian intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (between February and September 
2014), using coercion and force to take over and destabilise the territories of a 
neighbouring state, is a challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order. The 
relationship with the West has changed significantly. Moscow’s hard policies there and 
the challenge to Washington have made Russia more credible in the Middle East. With 
Putin, the war in Chechnya and the Russian involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
as well as in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, are explained by the need to secure 
state cohesion, expand its influence and protect itself against Western advances. 
The key objectives of this study are: to learn about the evolution of Russian foreign policy, 
especially since 2000, and the state of Moscow’s relationship with the Kurds, Ankara and 
Tehran. In the first section of this article, some of the different Russian foreign policy 
orientations are identified as well as their evolution along with the presidents who have 
been in the Kremlin since the end of the Cold War, assessing the impact of the war with 
Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (2014) in Russian foreign policy. The second section 
analyses Russia’s relations with Iran and Turkey, the evolution of this relationship and its 
positioning in the Middle East regarding the Kurdish problem. Finally, the interrelations 
between Moscow, Ankara, Tehran, and the Kurds, the influence of the Kurdish issue on 
the Tehran-Ankara Axis and Russian challenges in the geopolitical chess of the Middle 
East are addressed. This article is based on academic literature, official documents of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Kremlin, Russia and Middle 
East media. Support from Professors Mark N. Katz, Roy Allison and Licínia Simão as well 
as José Milhazes and José Manuel Félix Ribeiro is appreciated. 
 
                                                     
1  The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e 
a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of 
publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard. 
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1. Russian Foreign Policy: brief evolution  
The role of the leaders2 was always fundamental in the formulation and decision-making 
process of foreign policy in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)3 as well as in 
post-Soviet Russia, due to the strength of centralism and the characteristic authoritarian 
features of the Soviet system. Despite the constitution of a new state, the centralisation 
of political power, which in post-Soviet Russia has accentuated a strong personalisation 
of power, has lived on (Freire, 2014, pp. 16-17). This was a constant element of the 
Czarist Empire of the USSR and is still present today in Russia. This centralisation of 
power was (re)confirmed with the presidential election of Vladimir Putin for the third term 
(2012). 
Czarist Russia and the USSR represent centuries of centralised governance in which the 
defining lines of democracy, in a broad understanding of the concept – including not only 
popular participation in electoral acts, but also representativeness, individual rights and 
freedoms issues – were never present (Freire, 2014, p. 31). 
Mikhail Gorbachev is the central figure in the transformation of the USSR after the 
disenchantment with the governance of Leonid Brezhnev and the short leadership of Yuri 
Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (1982-1985). Internally, he put faith in a reformist 
course and externally he showed willingness to approach the West and to democratically 
open itself to the East. 
In Russia’s4 transition, the foreign policy reflected the constraints that Russian policies 
faced internally. General discontent regarding the transition process then initiated by 
Gorbachev5 contributed to Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the 1991 presidential election. The 
first Russian president, Yeltsin, tried to fully integrate the country by joining the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and forging a direct alliance with the US (Trenin, 
2014, p.9). But quickly the policy of opening up to the exterior and modernising gave 
rise to centralising and controlling tendencies. 
Vladimir Putin saw Russia as a great power and sought Western recognition6, unlike 
Gorbachev and Kozyrev, demonstrating his desire for domestic affirmation and to stand 
out in global affairs. 
After the announced exit of Yeltsin, 2000 was a turning point and marked the rise of 
Vladimir Putin. By 2008,7 Putin, through his policies based on a well-defined multi-
sectoral (2003-2004) presupposition, managed to introduce greater coherence to foreign 
policy (Freire, 2014, p. 34). Putin defined his foreign policy by adopting new documents 
that referred to changes, for example, in the concept of foreign policy. The 2000 Concept, 
                                                     
2 The leaders as well as the type of leadership shaped the way in which foreign policy is formulated and the 
behaviour of states within the international political scenario. 
3 On 25th December 1991 the USSR was officially extinguished. Fifteen new republics emerged on the world 
map, with a clear focus on the Russian Federation. The transition process initiated presupposed a new 
historical alignment and changes in the post-Soviet foreign policy due to the end of the Cold War, geographic 
redefinition and the new socio-economic politics. 
4 Throughout this article, the terms "Russia", "Russian Federation", "Moscow" and "Kremlin" are used at 
random in reference to the same country.  
5 In the last years as a Soviet leader, Moscow had hoped for a “common European home” and joint global 
leadership with the US, but these notions proved to be illusions. 
6 Russia has, historically, sought Western recognition. 
7 Dmitri Medvedev became president in 2008. After serving as prime minister, Putin assumed another 
presidential term. 
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for example, criticised the tendency to establish a unipolar world structure, whilst that of 
2008 reinforced that unilateral action destabilises international situations (Light & Cadier, 
2015, p.16). The guidelines of the Russian foreign policy, in the context of the end of 
bipolarity, were characterised by multi-sectorality – identifying concrete areas of action8 
– and multipolar order9 – in a discourse very centred on the exercise of counterbalance 
to American hegemony. Putin instilled a "new realism" into Russian foreign policy (Freire, 
2014, p.33) – which translates into a combination of a realist and traditional view of 
national interest and the pursuit of it in the international system, seeking to establish a 
genuinely equilateral dynamic of mutual advantage in the Russian integration in European 
and global structures, in the projection of Russian power and influence in the system – 
along with his affirmative position based on a stable internal context and economic 
growth. These elements support the search for recognition as well as legitimacy in 
regional and global policies. The foreign policy of revitalising the great power is the 
element that makes Putin popular in Russia (Trenin, 2016, p.2).  
Generally, the impact of a leader’s personal characteristics on foreign policy increases 
when his or her own authority and legitimacy are accepted by the population, or when 
they are protected from ample public criticism in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes 
(Freire & Vinha, 2015, p.36). Russian foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of the 
president, who is in charge of defining the basic lines of action underlying the position of 
the Russian Federation in international affairs (Freire, 2014, p.41). Thus, Putin designs, 
shapes and executes foreign policy decisions10 with the support of the security 
community.11 These decisions are based on his interpretation of national interest and also 
on the philosophical opinions about what is right and what is wrong  (Light & Cadier, 
2015, p.34). Therefore, the decision-making process in foreign policy is conditioned by 
external, domestic and psychological factors  (Freire & Vinha, 2015, p. 58). 
After 2007, the Russian foreign policy entered the stage of neo-revisionism12 (Sakwa, 
2014, 30) . From a status quo state, Russia has become a distinctive type of neo-
revisionist power, claiming to be a “norm-enforcer” and not just a “norm-taker” (Sakwa, 
2014, 31). The election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russian president in March 2008 meant 
continuity of the Russian foreign policy, following the tendency of reinforcing the lines of 
assertive pragmatic policy, which characterises Putin’s legacy. He combined growth 
resulting from the use of energy resources with a new foreign policy vector based on 
domestic modernisation (liberalism), building "modernisation alliances" aimed at various 
aspects, from leading scientific research to the formation of the individual (Tsygankov, 
2016) (Freire, 2014, p.35).  
                                                     
8 Since 2000, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been defined as a foremost area of action 
for Moscow, in which priority is given to the development of good relationships with neighbouring states 
and the strategic partnership. The policies of Putin and Medvedev for the CIS have developed in the line of 
reaffirmation of the Russian influence in the area. 
9 In the post-2008 Russia understands the international order as multipolar and considers itself an important 
actor. The option for multipolarity is one of the lines of rupture with the Soviet past and is justified by the 
inability of the Russian Federation to be seen as a hegemonic power. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Russia’s definition of multipolarity has deepened. 
10 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation develops general foreign policy strategy, presents 
relevant proposals to the president and implements the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. It also 
coordinates the foreign policy activities of the federal executive bodies and international cooperation in 
accordance with the Executive Order of the Russian Federation No. 1478 of 8th November 2011 on the role 
of the foreign policy coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
11 The world view of the Security Council of the Russian Federation presents international relations in terms 
of an endless struggle for domination and influence among some powerful countries. 
12 Its essence is the attempt to ensure the universal application of international standards.  
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We must be more effective in using foreign policy instruments 
specifically for the pursuit of national goals, to modernise our 
Country, economy, social life and, to some extent, the political 
system, in order to solve the various challenges that our society 
faces. (Tsygankov, 2016, p.209)  
 
Thus, by analysing this excerpt – from Medvedev’s speech held at the meeting with the 
ambassadors and permanent representatives of international organisations on 12th July 
2010 – the importance of modernising the domestic economy is highlighted. It was also 
necessary to develop a policy that would provide conditions for foreign investment in 
technology that would provide economic development and create the necessary 
conditions for the development of non-energy areas to overcome Russia’s excessive 
dependence on energy exports (an economy directly dependent on prices in the 
international market). The years of Medvedev (2008-2012) as Russian president were 
not characterised by the attempt to affirm more liberal policies in the economic and social 
dimensions as several analysts state. 
The Russian campaign in Georgia has triggered the most significant crisis in Russian 
foreign relations with Western countries since the dissolution of the USSR (Allison, 2008, 
p. 1169). The case of Georgia is paradigmatic in the context of the development of 
relations and the position of Moscow in the CIS. The five-day war in Georgia in August 
2008 corresponded to a policy of reasserting Moscow in the post-Soviet space in the face 
of Western influence and, above all, before a set of US-led policies and actions, which 
were considered in Moscow as surpassing a policy of strategic cooperation, having direct 
implications for national security (Freire & Simão, 2014, p. 92). The Russian intervention 
in South Ossetia (Georgia) had as its central justification the protection of its nationals 
(Allison, 2008, pp. 1153-1154, 1167-1169). The Russian response to the Georgian attack 
on Tskhinvali (capital of South Ossetia) included the temporary occupation of part of 
Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia on 26th August 2008 (Sakwa, 2014, p. 40). This was a response to the 
threat of NATO enlargement. Moscow invaded Georgia driven by a policy of power 
projection in the post-Soviet area, with the objective of weakening the country, affirming 
itself in the CIS (vital area), reinforcing the strategy of constraining the presence of US 
military bases in Eurasia and underlining its recognition in the international system as a 
great power (Freire, 2015, p. 209). This Russian attitude fits into the most widely used 
theory to understand the phenomena of international relations – Realpolitik or political 
realism (Burchill, et al., 2013, p. 33). Kenneth N. Waltz, founder of neorealism or 
structural realism (1979),13 advocates that the structure of the international system has 
created a platform of competition among states seeking security, and because of its 
anarchic nature, sometimes that structure predisposes that states adopt expansionist 
and revisionist behaviours (Sousa & Mendes, 2014, p. XXIV). In this perspective, Russia 
assumes a constant impulse to assert its power and guarantee security (Tsygankov, 
2016, p. 11). 
                                                     
13 A successful attempt to overcome the approach of classical realism and to develop a more rigorous and 
neo-economic explanatory model of the structural constraints of the competitive and anarchic system of IR.  
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Pragmatism was recurrent in Putin and Medvedev's foreign policy statements, and, in 
practice, perhaps except for the Georgian war, it was the hallmark of their policy before 
2014 (Light & Cadier, 2015, p. 18).  In 2011, Medvedev finally admitted that Russia’s 
main motivation for sending troops to Georgia had been to avoid its membership in NATO 
(Allison, 2014, pp. 1269-1270). The result of this military incursion was a slight 
revisionism, oriented towards the marking of a different vis-à-vis position with the West 
as well as towards the idea of multipolarity and demonstration that its influence in the 
post-Soviet space remained.  (Marques, 2016, p. 46). 
Putin returned to the Kremlin 14 for a third term (May 2012) almost immediately after 
the Arab Spring and in a context of internal decline marked by a new phase of difficulties 
in relations with the West  (Freire, 2015, p. 211). The Ukraine crisis was responsible for 
some of these difficulties. Since February 2014 the Kremlin had been in a war mode with 
Putin as the leader (Taussig & Ryan, 2016). It all began when Russia occupied the Crimea 
in March 2014 to remedy a historical injustice15  (Allison, 2014, p. 1286). In fact, Putin 
reacted like this to the events that took place in Kiev, in late 2013 and early 2014, that 
led to the fall of Viktor Yanukovych from the presidential post when he refused to sign 
the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement  (Milhazes, 2017, p. 24). According 
to Putin’s account of the initial operation of Russia in the Crimea, the NATO factor 
certainly stands out (Allison, 2014, p. 1273). The main objective was to prevent Ukraine 
from joining NATO (Sakwa, 2014) and, ideally, to recover it for the Euro-Asian integration 
project – to compete with the EU – whose main element is the reunification of what 
Moscow considers "the Russian world" (Russkii mir) (Trenin, 2014, p. 6). The intervention 
in Ukraine appears as an extreme expression of a policy of strategic denial, based on 
Putin’s increasing effort to demarcate the CIS order as a “no-go zone” for NATO (Allison, 
2014, p. 1269). The reunification of Crimea and [Russian] actions in Donbass provoked 
a wave of sanctions (Sakwa, 2014, 113). The Russian policies suffered an immediate and 
strong negative reaction from the US and its allies (Trenin, 2014, p. 8). The Russian 
military intervention in Ukraine was based on the constant Western (NATO and EU) 
advances in Eastern Europe, negatively influencing Russian's perception of them as a 
threat to Russia’s security (Marques, 2016, pp. 8-9). The Putinist challenge to the 
“sovereign right” of the Atlantic security system along with expanding Russian borders 
was clear and provoked a response in sanctions and other pressures whose ultimate logic 
was to change the regime in Russia (Light & Cadier, 2015, p. 69). The Ukraine crisis and 
the formal annexation of Crimea (18th March, 2014) by the genuinely revisionist Russian 
state (Sakwa, 2014, p. 116)16 stand as the turning point in Russian foreign policy and a 
defining moment in Russian history.  
In contrast with 2000, when the EU was at the top of the list, it was now below the BICS 
(Brazil, India, China and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the CIS 
and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and even below relations with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (Light & Cadier, 2015, p. 72). The domestic political goals of protecting 
the regime from outside influence, of consolidating the regime’s internal cohesion and 
                                                     
14 The centralisation of power, which hinders the democratisation of Russian political structures and the 
consolidation of a truly pluralist regime, remained with Putin. 
15 In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev took the initiative of transferring the Crimea (and Sevastopol) to Ukrainian 
jurisdiction. The annexation of the Crimea is Russian revenge for its defeat and post-Cold War victimisation.   
16 Offensive realism assumes that states want to maximise their power and that, especially hegemonic states, 
must do so through expansionist policies and the imposition of their power and interests on weaker and 
enemy states.  
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renewing Putin’s support base have affected Russian foreign policy since 2012. These 
goals also contributed to a stronger nationalist rhetoric in foreign policy discourse, an 
increasing characterisation of Europe as a threat (confrontational attitude towards the 
West), an increasing investment in soft power and a renewed attempt to build the post-
Soviet space as a buffer zone (Light & Cadier, 2015, p. 213). 
 
2.  Asia Orientation: the Greater Middle East  
Euroasianism, personified in Putin, acquired clear relevance on the agenda of Russian 
foreign policy after becoming popular with Yeltsin and with the pragmatic Yevgeny 
Primakov. The identification of Russia as a Eurasian country reinforced the growing 
importance that Eastern relations took under Putin’s leadership. 
Central Asia has been prominent in Russian foreign policy, particularly in strategic issues 
related to Caspian energy and the importance of regional dynamics in stabilising 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Strengthening cooperation, for example, with Iran17 is central 
to understand the eastern dimension of Russian foreign policy  (Freire, 2011, p. 58). Iran 
and Turkey, influential regional actors on the border between the Caucasus and the Middle 
East, have become fundamental to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East (Freire, 2011, 
p. 208). In the context of the extension of the geographical relations, “Russia intends to 
develop and deepen relations with Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Lebanon, Pakistan” (Freire, 2011, p. 231). 
The use of force has once again become an active instrument of Russian foreign policy 
within and beyond the former Soviet space (Trenin, 2016, p. 3). Even though other actors 
are sometimes considered, the state is the main actor of power competition due to its 
ability to mobilise and organise essential community resources to defend itself or to 
expand militarily (Reis, 2016, p. 6). The intervention in Syria, posing a challenge to 
Washington, is an example of Putin’s unpredictability. Moscow has broken a post-Cold 
War US monopoly regarding the global use of force and has staged a spectacular 
geopolitical return in a region that it abandoned in the decaying years of the USSR 
(Trenin, 2016, p. 1). For Tsygankov (Tsygankov, 2016, 243), Moscow intervened with a 
desire to resume relations with the West, to support al-Assad (Lund, 2016), to be 
recognised as a great power, to maintain Syria as its geopolitical and military strength 
and to take commercial advantages related to arms' sales in Damascus (Berman, 2016).  
Nikolay Kozhanov categorised the objectives and reasons that influenced Moscow to 
increase its activity in the Middle East in three groups: economic (to compensate for the 
negative political and economic implications of the tension experienced with the West,18 
and to protect the interests of Russian gas and oil corporations through energy 
agreements); political (to promote dialogue between the main actors of the Middle East 
and the Russian vision of the future of the IR system); security (to restrict potential 
threats to Russia’s security in non-European parts of Eurasia by combating international 
terrorism, Islamic radicalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cross-
                                                     
17 Until 1935, the current Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was known by the official name of Persia. By decision 
of Muhammad Reza Shah, in that year, the country changed the official designation for Iran and, following 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution that resulted in the deposition of the Shah, Muhammad Reza, adopted its 
current name. Iran and IRI will be used throughout the article. 
18 The European countries chose, for example, to suspend the South Stream natural gas pipeline, a new and 
important energy channel with which Moscow expected to increase its market share in Europe. 
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border crime) (Kozhanov, 2015). The growing terrorist threat poses a great danger, and 
combating it is very important to ensure security in Russian cities and in the international 
community. 
According to Richard Sakwa, Putin’s disillusionment with the West (after Ukrainian events 
in 2014) implied not only a shift to a greater Asian orientation, but also a much more 
substantive attempt to give shape and substance to a reenergised view of Russia as a 
bicontinental power (Light & Cadier, 2015, p. 70). Russia has focused on countries (Iran 
and Turkey) with economic, geopolitical and military advantages. The policy of containing 
Western advances through alliances and partnerships is a goal. According to the new 
Foreign Policy Concept,19 Moscow wants to strengthen its relationship with the Arab world 
by participating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 
 
Russia intends to further expand bilateral relations with the States 
in the Middle East and North Africa, including by relying on the 
ministerial meeting of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, and 
continuing strategic dialogue with the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf.(Russia, 2016) 
 
The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, in view of the growing importance of the Islamic 
variable in equating power relations in a new multipolar order, had already made 
reference to the strengthening of Russia’s relations with Islamic countries, with 
participation as an observer state in the Islamic Conference and in the League of Arab 
States (Freire, 2011, p. 231). Russia’s desire to get closer to Arab partners in a context 
of the growing threat of Islamic radicalism fits into counterterrorism. Russia’s relations 
with regional actors, in particular Syria, Iran and Turkey, are revealing Russian interests 
in the area and complexity in bilateral and multilateral relations (Freire, 2011, p. 211). 
The Kremlin has been pursuing the goals of the “new Russia” to assert itself and 
consolidate power. 
Subsequently, the evolution of Russian relations with Turkey and Iran as well as their 
relations with the Kurds are analysed. 
 
a) Ankara 
From the numerous wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire to recent 
energy agreements between Ankara and Moscow, the relationship between Turkey and 
Russia has always been marked by great ambiguity (Barrinha, 2014, p. 253). 
Currently separated by the Islamic republics of the South Caucasus, Turkey and the 
Russian Federation were, until the end of the bipolar system, countries with common 
borders, parallel ambitions and antagonistic alliances. 
Between the years of 1676 and 1917 the two countries were opponents in twelve wars. 
The war of 1768-1774 would have a special meaning since the heavy defeat of the 
Ottoman forces meant the end of hegemony in the Black Sea (Barrinha, 2014, p. 254). 
During the second half of the 20th century until the end of the Cold War, it was 
                                                     
19 The concept was approved by Putin on 30th November, 2016. 
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characterised by the imbalance between the USSR and post-imperial Turkey concerned 
with the consolidation of the republic.20 
In the 1960s Russia and Turkey (re)approached, since Russia opened up politically with 
Nikita Khrushchev and Turkey was dissatisfied with the US regarding the Cyprus issue. 
Only in September 1984 did the Turkish government, led by Turgut Ozal, sign an energy 
agreement with Russia in the issue of natural gas. This agreement is still regarded today 
as a milestone in the relationship between the two countries (Barrinha, 2014, p. 256). A 
year and a half later, it was the turn of the Russian company Gazexport and Turkey's 
Boots to sign a trade agreement for a period of 25 years (Barrinha, 2014, p. 256). The 
end of the Cold War had as fundamental consequences for the Turkish foreign policy, on 
the one hand, the resizing of its relations with the former Soviet space of Turkish cultural 
roots and, on the other hand, with the Middle East (Barrinha, 2015, p. 478). The 
relationship between them, during the presidency of Yeltsin, was characterised by 
bilateral cooperation. In the context of the emergence of new powers and a post-
American world, Turkey came into direct contact with Brazil, the People’s Republic of 
China, India and the Russian Federation. 
The strengthening of internal legitimacy, the existence of a basic doctrine associated with 
the new minister for foreign affairs, strong economic growth and the progressive 
affirmation of new poles of power in the international system contributed to a change in 
Turkey’s attitude concerning its foreign policy (Barrinha, 2015, p. 485). The change was 
reflected in an attitude of more global activity. 
For Moscow, the relationship with Turkey is part of a strategy of simultaneous expansion 
of economic relations and constraint of the influence of the West in its neighbourhood. 
On the Turkish side, this approach is related to a new way of doing foreign policy with 
the Justice and Development Party and the minister for foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu. 
Energy has been the area that has most united these two states in the last decades.21 In 
this energy context, there are two issues that characterise the Turkish-Russian 
relationship: on the one hand, the economic relationship between the two countries; on 
the other, the geopolitics of the issue (Barrinha, 2014, p. 259). Gas and oil pipelines have 
had fundamental importance in the energy relationship. Russia’s top priority is the Turkish 
Stream Gas Pipeline (substitute of the abandoned South Stream project), which is 
expected to supply 15.75 billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey by 2020 as well as to 
Southeast Europe (Baev & Kirişci, 2017, p. 7). According to Putin, its implementation will 
significantly increase the energy security of Turkey and Europe, boosting the chances of 
exporting Russian gas to Turkey. Erdoğan’s decision to grant the Russian State Atomic 
Energy Corporation (Rosatom) the rights to build the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in 
southern Turkey is controversial. As Pavel Baev and Kemal Kirişci note, it would grant 
Russia “control over a significant portion of Turkey’s electricity production” (Baev & 
Kirişci, 2017, p. 7). In contrast to Turkey’s energy diversification goals, the projects will 
aggravate its dependence on Russian energy (Taussig, 2017). Turkey imports between 
50% and 55% of its gas needs from Russia (Baev & Kirişci, 2017, p. 6). 
                                                     
20 Its consolidation was marked by the well-known principle of Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk" Pascha: "Peace at 
Home, Peace in the World". 
21 In January 2015 Putin travelled to Istanbul to propose the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkey to the 
borders of Europe. 
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Regarding security and conflict issues, bilateral relations have been characterised by 
geopolitical dynamics such as the Iranian nuclear issue, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
the Balkan War (1990) and the Eastern Mediterranean issue (Cyprus and Syria). Turkey 
and Russia have convergent perceptions regarding the world order, development of 
energy projects and cooperation in enhancing security in the Black Sea. This relationship 
can be explained by the strong and stable leaderships of Putin and Erdoğan as well as by 
the international scenario, which is favourable to the rise of emerging powers after the 
crisis of 2008, acquiring a growing prominence in the international scenario (Barrinha, 
2014, p. 268). 
These countries’ agenda have, since 2011, focused on the Middle East and, particularly, 
on the Arab Spring, which is differently read by Putin and Erdoğan. Baev and Kirişci (Baev 
& Kirişci, 2017, p.4) state: “Turkish leadership hailed the popular uprisings as a 'grand 
restoration' of Islamic civilization and expected the formation of a 'Muslim Brotherhood 
belt', stretching across Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria”. Erdoğan tried to reorient Turkey 
as the leader of an emerging Islamic civilisation in the Middle East  (Taussig, 2017). 
However, Putin understands political Islamism as a real threat to Russia’s security (RO). 
He distrusts Erdoğan’s support and connections with radical Islamic groups in Syria, and 
it is interesting for him that this ideology fails regionally. 
Turkey and the Russian Federation diverge on the paths to be taken on the Syrian conflict. 
Ankara, since the beginning of the crisis, has tried to reach a common position with 
Moscow, but it has been difficult. On the one hand, Moscow wants Syria to remain as an 
area of influence, which allows it to guarantee access to the Mediterranean coast,22 re-
routing and increasing its influence in an area of strategic multidimensional interest 
(Freire, s.d., p. 41). For Ankara, the potential for a Kurdish entity to emerge along its 
long border has been assessed as the main threat to security that could arise from conflict 
(Çandar, 2017). Turning to the Kurdish question, Moscow insisted that the Kurds should 
integrate the process of political solution with Syria. Despite Erdoğan’s disapproval, 
Moscow furthered ties with the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD), a strong Kurdish 
operational faction in Syria that elaborated a new Syrian constitution, granting significant 
autonomy to Kurdish regions (Taussig, 2017). Russian protection of the PYD gave rise to 
the Kurdish problem with Ankara. Recently, the historic agreement between a Russian 
state oil company, Rosneft, and the Kurdistan Regional Government – to buy Kurdish oil 
– shows that Russia sees the Kurds as important actors in the future of the Middle East. 
Through the activities of Rosneft, Moscow gained influence over Turkish and Iranian 
interests on the Kurdish issue and, potentially, reaffirmed its influence of oil and gas 
exports on not only Ankara but also on major economies in southern Europe  (Jaffe, 
2017) (Barmin, 2017). In Syria and Iraq, Russia favours the real autonomy of the Kurds 
(Trenin, 2017), despite the rather ambiguous (Azizi, 2017) Russian reaction to the 
Kurdish referendum (25th September 2017). The independence of Iraqi Kurdistan would 
probably be detrimental to Russian regional interests. It would cause a disagreement 
between Russia and Turkey and Iran, two actors with whom Moscow is aligned in the 
Middle East (Barmin, 2017). 
                                                     
22   In 1971, the USSR installed a naval support and maintenance base for the Syrian port of Tartus. This naval 
base is the only one that is outside the so-called post-Soviet space and is endowed with a greater capacity 
of projection in the Eastern Mediterranean area. This naval base, the only one of warm waters, is important 
for Russian ambitions to play a greater geopolitical role in the Eastern Mediterranean area and in the Middle 
East. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 103-121  
Evolution of Russian foreign policy and the Middle East 
Henrique Alves Garcia 
 113 
 
Russian-Turkish relations have experienced a tense period since the 2015 incident, when 
a Russian warplane entered Turkish airspace and was overthrown by Turkish forces near 
the Turkish-Syrian border. 
Moscow imposed economic sanctions on Ankara,23 which, according to initial estimates, 
cost Turkey US$ 10 billion in lost trade at a time when the Turkish economy was declining 
(Tank, 2016). However, bilateral relations have been restored since August 2016. At the 
end of a meeting in November, Putin said that “in regards to Russia-Turkey cooperation, 
you could say our relation has been practically fully restored” (ru, 2017). Ilshat Saetov, 
from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Al-Monitor 
that, although Moscow forgives Ankara, he does not trust Turkey anymore 
(Chulkovskaya, 2017). 
During the conference held on 3rd May 2017, Putin said that only political and diplomatic 
means can contribute to the solution of the Syrian conflict. Russia, Turkey and Iran, 
despite their competing interests, deepened their cooperation in Syria by launching the 
Astana format in early 2017 to enact a ceasefire and negotiate the end of the conflict. 
Putin again stated the strategic importance of Ankara and referred to the importance of 
normalising their relations: 
 
Turkey is an important and promising partner of Russia. For some 
time, the durability of our bilateral relations, as we know, has been 
tested. We can now confidently say that the period of recovery for 
the ties between Russia and Turkey is over and we are returning to 
normal cooperation between the partners.Our countries are firmly 
committed to strengthening cooperation in many areas, according 
to the spirit and as mentioned in the treaty on the foundations of 
bilateral relations, which will have its 25th anniversary at the end of 
May. (ru, 2016) 
 
Russia and Turkey have taken important steps to improve their relations since the 2015 
incident. In addition, Putin signed a law (31st May 2017) removing some of the 
restrictions imposed on Turkey24 after the meeting with his Turkish counterpart 
((RFE/RL), 2017) (ru, 2017). On 1st December, Russia completely lifted the ban on 
imports of Turkish tomatoes (Chulkovskaya, 2017). 
Regarding Syria, it should be noted that the Astana meetings, as well as the 
memorandum on de-escalation zones, contributed to reducing violence in the country, 
according to Putin and Erdoğan. 
 
b) Tehran 
According to Mark Katz, despite their differences, Russia and Iran have cooperated in 
Syria concerning arms sales and economic affairs. Tehran, in the post-Cold War context, 
                                                     
23 4Russia banned, for example, imports of Turkish tomatoes. Ankara imposed large import duties on Russian 
wheat in March but resumed purchases after the meeting of the presidents in May 2017.  
24  The sanctions were imposed on Turkish companies operating in Russia and Turkish nationals who wanted 
to work in Russian territory. 
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was obliged to abandon the principle of “neither West nor East” in regards to its foreign 
policy and established the principle of “North and South”  (Simão, 2015, p. 415). Its 
position meant openness to the republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The 
relationship with Iran is crucial because Russia can neutralise Iranian influence in 
Chechnya and other Islamic areas defined as a threat, particularly in the Caucasus. In 
offensive realism, Tehran is an ally to counterbalance the Western threat, since Moscow 
has sought to project itself as a great power after decades of reduced influence and 
status. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is a key country in the Middle East, Central Asia and 
the Caspian25 as well as in the Kremlin’s economic and security interests (Trenin, 2016). 
Moscow is prepared to establish relations with the regime of Ali Khamenei26 regarding 
trade, energy and security. 
Tehran has not always been a reliable partner for Moscow. For example, in December 
2008, the Russian government was strongly surprised when – despite the agreements 
established with the Persian regime – the IRI voted against St Petersburg, making it 
favourable for Qatar to be the site of the executive and secretariat of the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum (GECF). The Iranian voice seemed to be decisive in the voting by the 
members of the organisation (Kozhanov, 2015). Russia intended to be influential in the 
international gas market but, as mentioned above, it was not. 
Since Putin became the president again in 2012, Russian-Iranian relations have 
experienced a significant turnaround, in contrast to the substantial cooling of the bilateral 
dialogue that characterised the last two years of Medvedev’s presidency (Kozhanov, 
2015). His view of the Kremlin’s top priorities in the international arena was greatly 
affected by the failure to restore relations between Washington and Moscow and the 
beginning of tensions with the West concerning Syria. Disappointed with the attempts to 
overcome obstacles in the relations with the West, Putin was determined to develop 
relations with non-Western countries (Kozhanov, 2015).  Iran’s geostrategic position has 
allowed it to influence the development of the situation in the Caspian, Caucasus, Central 
Asia and Middle East. This reality forced Moscow to discuss various foreign policy issues 
with Iran, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the stability of Tajikistan,27 NATO activities in the South Caucasus (cooperation with 
Georgia and Azerbaijan), the presence of non-regional powers in the Middle East and 
Central Asia, the construction of trans-Caspian pipelines and the instability in the 
Caucasus. The IRI support was considered relevant to the success of Moscow’s activities 
to strengthen Russia’s post-1991 regional position. 
In September 2014, Lavrov designated the IRI as a "natural ally" in the struggle against 
the religious extremists of the Middle East (Kozhanov, 2015). The departure of 
Ahmadinejad and the election of Hassan Rouhani did not significantly affect the tendency 
of deepening cooperation. The results of the Arab Spring in the region demanded Moscow 
to be more active when contacting the IRI after the victory of Rouhani28 in 2013. 
                                                     
25 Russia is a good market for Iran’s products. 
26 He was the president of the IRI between 1981 and 1989, elevated to the category of Ayatollah and appointed 
as supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts. 
27 In the mid-1990s, the regimes of Moscow and Tehran banded together to halt the civil war that then broke 
out in Tajikistan. 
28  He wanted, in his first term, to strengthen relations with the West, which alarmed the Kremlin. 
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In 2014, the tension between Russia and the US and EU, resulting from the Ukrainian 
crisis, contributed to strengthening the Kremlin’s cooperation with Iran (Kozhanov, 
2015), and also their economic and geopolitical ties with non-Western countries 
(Borshchevskaya, 2015). In the context of this tension, Russian companies had to look 
for new commercial and investment opportunities in the IRI. 
In August 2016, at a summit held in Baku, Putin, Hassan Rouhani and Ilham Aliyev from 
Azerbaijan committed themselves to the development of a 7,200-km-long trade corridor 
linking the countries via rail (Trenin, 2016). For the Kremlin, IRI offers significant 
economic opportunities due to its population size and potential for growth in technology, 
education and culture. 
The Caspian Sea region is one of the oldest oil producers in the world and is growing 
rapidly as a natural gas producer (EIA, 2013, p. 1). 
The Caspian issue encompasses political, economic, diplomatic and military aspects  
(Sazhin, 2016, p. 13). The legal status of the Caspian area has been a complex topic 
because there is no agreement on whether the "body of water" is defined as a “sea” or a 
“lake”. There is currently no defined legal definition for the Caspian since coastal states29 
should unanimously agree on a definition (EIA, 2013, p. 4). Sergei Lavrov said, after a 
recent meeting [4-5th December 2017] Caspian states, that after more than 20 years of 
negotiations, an agreement on the status of the Caspian was “practically ready” to sign 
(Pannier, 2017). In 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a number of bilateral 
agreements concerning the boundary lines of the areas adjacent to the Caspian. However, 
Iran (considering the Caspian a lake) did not recognise the legitimacy of the tripartite 
initiative, calling for equal division of 20% of the seabed and the surface of the Caspian 
(Sazhin, 2016, p. 14) (EIA, 2013, p. 5). There are contradictions between Moscow and 
Tehran in their territorial division: there is no consensus on the governance regime for 
navigation in areas under national jurisdiction (Kozhanov, 2015). 
Iran and Russia were united in the negative attitude towards the Trans-Caspian project, 
supported by Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Neither Russia nor Iran want the failure of 
the European gas transport project for the future Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Caspian and 
Sea-Azerbaijan-European routes (Sazhin, 2016, p. 15). 
Regarding the Syrian conflict, Moscow and Tehran are not fully aligned, since their 
political strategies are different. They want to prevent the overthrow of the Assad regime 
and maintain state institutions (Sazhin, 2016, p. 16), but there is a fundamental 
divergence with regard to their objectives. Moscow has defended the integrity of Syria: 
 
Russia supports the unity, independence and territorial integrity of 
the Syrian Arab Republic as a secular, democratic and pluralistic 
state with all ethnic and religious groups living in peace and security 
and enjoying equal rights and opportunities” (see more detailed 
information in Sazhin 2016 and the Foreign Policy Concept)  
 
                                                     
29  Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran.  
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When Putin intervened in Syria,30 supposedly to combat Daesh and to prevent Assad’s 
defeat, he meant to secure military and economic interests, particularly natural gas 
pipelines crossing Syria (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 243) (Tank, 2016). One of the main 
objectives of the Russian intervention has gained US recognition concerning the fact that 
Russia is a great power (Trenin, 2016). On the other hand, the Iranians intend to maintain 
a friendly regime in Damascus, preserve the crucial links to Hezbollah, the Lebanese 
armed movement, and strengthen influence in Assad-controlled Syria (Trenin, 2016). 
Tehran is aware that the political survival of the Syrian regime will allow it to maintain 
the dream of regional leadership and promote the "Shiite bow" (Pinto, 2015, p. 117). 
Concerning the Kurdish issue, whilst Russia supported Syrian Kurds as well as their hopes 
for a federal solution that would give them autonomy in Syria, Iran and Turkey opposed 
these aspirations (Katz, 2016). 
Russia is looking for a result that may, eventually, include some political commitment, 
consider the factions in conflict in Syria and the important regional actors, whilst 
preserving their interests. The potential for discord between the IRI and Russia lies in 
regional geopolitics, in the debate on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and in gas 
exports. 
In the foreseeable future, Moscow and Tehran will need each other to achieve their 
broader goals, even though they recognise that cooperation has clear limits. 
Understanding its limits can make the relationship sustainable and moderately 
successful, despite a sordid history (for the Iranians) and deep and persistent mistrust. 
With Rouhani and Putin, important steps have been taken to strengthen bilateral 
cooperation, particularly with the implementation of major projects, including the launch 
of the second Bushehr bloc and the thermoelectric plant in Bandar Abbas as examples of 
new links between them ((IRNA), 2017). It should be noted that the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant produces electricity with full capacity. 
In the economic context, the major challenge for Moscow is to manage relations with 
Shiite Iran, whilst deepening dialogue with Saudi Arabia (Trenin, 2016). In fact, good 
management of relations with major oil producers is important for the Russian economic 
development. But the excellent line of communication with Tel Aviv, the good relations 
with Cairo and Riyadh and the relationship with the Kurds constantly test Russian 
diplomacy and balance of power. 
 
Final considerations 
The sanctification of the great status of Russia’s power and the declared preference for a 
multipolar world order has been a constant. There was a clear shift in Putin’s political 
position and rhetoric, adopting a more ideological, more conservative and nationalistic 
tone with the start of his third term. With the Ukraine crisis and its consequences, 
changes in Russian foreign policy are marked by a clear distance from the West and the 
search for new allies and partners, mostly in the Middle East and North Africa, where 
Western domination could be challenged. 
                                                     
30  Since then, Moscow has coordinated operations with Damascus and Tehran as well as with Iraq. Russia has 
obtained permission from Iran and Iraq to use airspace for air strikes. 
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Putin’s recent diplomatic initiatives regarding Syria and meeting with all the Middle East 
leaders mean he wants to avoid the costs of continuing conflicts and increased security 
risks for Russia. For Waltz, it is clear that states seek, above all, to maximise their 
security. Active diplomacy in Syria serves to strengthen its domestic image before 
Russian presidential elections of 2018. According to Katz, the diplomatic marathon may 
be a sign of Putin’s fear that, in case the Syrian conflict continues and the regional 
situation worsens, Russia’s ability to control the situation and its image as a great power 
will deteriorate. 
Moscow’s relations with Ankara and Tehran have been strengthened by energy 
agreements and counterterrorism cooperation, despite their differences. Iran and Turkey, 
being able to approach one another - if Ankara seeks a new course of collision with Israel 
(a full supporter of the Kurdish independence), Tehran will move even closer to Ankara 
– will remain limited in the ability to act together in the Middle East, in addition to the 
common anti-Israel and anti-Kurdish stance. Moscow seeks to present itself to the 
countries of the Middle East as a pragmatic, non-ideological, reliable, experienced and 
sensible player capable of assessing regional issues through diplomatic and military 
means and also adopting an ambiguous stance. It strengthened economic ties with Iraqi 
Kurdistan (through Rosneft) and with the Syrian Kurds, intending to project an image of 
great power there. Iraq’s instability, the Syrian conflict and the physical collapse of Daesh 
present new challenges but also new opportunities for the Kurds. 
The potential contradictions of these “bridges” that Moscow has established in the 
geopolitical kaleidoscope of the Middle East are intriguing. Some of them represent a 
“hidden dialogue” with Washington that might make Tehran and Ankara very suspicious 
and also the fact that allies and opponents constantly change. 
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